MARKET-CAUTIOUS FEMINISM

Maxine Eichner

ABSTRACT

This paper poses the question of whether the mainstream feminist movement in the United States, in concentrating its efforts on achieving gender parity in the existing workplace, is selling women short. In it, I argue that contemporary U.S. feminism has not adequately theorized the problems with the relatively unregulated market system in the United States. That failure has contributed to a situation in which women’s participation in the labor market is mistakenly equated with liberation, and in which other far-ranging effects of the market system on women’s lives inside and outside of work – many of them negative – are overlooked. To theorize the effects of the market system on women’s lives in a more nuanced manner, I borrow from the insights of earlier Marxist and socialist feminists. I then use this more nuanced perspective to outline an agenda for feminism, which I call “market-cautious feminism,” that seeks to regulate the market to serve women’s interests.

Keywords: Families; market capitalism; feminism; work
Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, you cannot see the other wires .... It is only when you step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see why the bird does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment .... It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon .... As the cageness of the birdcage is a macroscopic phenomenon, the oppressiveness of the situations in which women live our various and different lives is a macroscopic phenomenon ... – a network of forces and barriers which are systematically related and which conspire to the immobilization, reduction and molding of women and the lives we live .... (Frye, 1983, p. 23)

Slightly more than 50 years ago, Betty Friedan kicked off second-wave feminism in the United States by calling for women to get out of the home and into paid jobs (Friedan, 1963). In the ensuing years, the majority of U.S. women have done just that. While some women – particularly black and other minority women – had long been in the workforce, many other women joined them.1 By now, women have moved into the workforce so decidedly that some commentators have proclaimed victory for the feminist movement, declaring the rise of women and the “end of men” (Rosin, 2012). Other feminists have declared, however, that sex equality has not yet been achieved in the workplace, even if women have made significant progress toward this goal. In this vein, Sheryl Sandberg has argued that women must “lean in” to their careers to “reignite” the feminist “revolution” (Sandberg, 2013, p. 11).

While the extent of progress toward gender parity in the workplace is being debated (see, e.g., Blau & Kahn, 2013), less attention has been paid recently to whether that goal should have been, or should continue to be, the appropriate endpoint of feminism. This issue was hotly debated early in second-wave feminism, however. At that time, both Marxist and socialist feminists, whom I will refer to together as “Marxian feminists,”2 were far more critical of the liberatory prospects for women’s entry into the workplace than mainstream liberal feminists. While Marxian feminists believed that women’s gaining paid work would generally be a positive step for sex equality, they also believed that, given the way the market was structured at the time, obtaining paid work would by no means be a panacea for women. In their view, particular features of the labor market under capitalism – for example, its tendency to offload the work associated with maintaining and reproducing the workforce to the domestic realm – created real impediments
to women’s achieving labor market parity in the absence of a large-scale transformation of the organization of work (Barrett, 1997, pp. 123–129; Hartmann, 1976). Put in the somewhat dated terms of early socialist feminism, they believed that patriarchy and capitalism were sufficiently intertwined that, without restructuring capitalism, it would be difficult to eliminate patriarchy. Further, even if labor market parity in the existing workplace was an achievable goal, Marxian feminists questioned whether it was an attractive goal given what they saw as the stultifying and hierarchical organization of existing market work. Again, put in the terminology of early second-wave socialist feminists, they believed that women’s entry into the market would trade off one system of domination of women – patriarchy – for another system – capitalism. Yet over time, the arguments of these Marxian feminists were lost in the fray as mainstream feminism, increasingly dominated by liberal feminists, coalesced around the goal of labor market parity.

In this essay, I seek to revive the question of whether U.S. feminism, in urging women into the workplace without seeking significant reform of the free-market system, is selling women short. I argue that contemporary feminism has not adequately theorized the problems with the relatively unregulated market system in the United States. That failure, in my view, has contributed to a situation in which women’s participation in the market is mistakenly equated with liberation, and in which other far-ranging effects of the market system on women’s lives inside and outside of work – many of them negative – are overlooked. The result has been that while women’s situation is in many respects less confined than it was at the start of the second wave, in some respects their strictures have simply changed form. Women at the start of the second wave were described as confined within a birdcage, trapped into limited lives by patriarchal strictures (Frye, 1983, pp. 4–7); now they are better described as running on a metaphorical hamster wheel driven by the market, with the wheel moving progressively faster. It may be a mark of women’s progress that many men, too, are also running on this wheel (although, given women’s continued greater caretaking responsibilities, they generally need to run faster than men, and are generally not as well paid, to boot), but this progress should not be confused with emancipation.

In borrowing from the insights of earlier Marxist and socialist feminists, I do not seek to incorporate these theories, or Marx’s work, wholesale or uncritically. Some (although not all) of the reasons that Marxism’s influence became increasingly muted during the course of the 1970s and 1980s were, in my view, good ones. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century revealed many difficulties with at least some forms of
socialism. The fall of the Eastern bloc also revealed the many benefits experienced by capitalist countries when compared with former Soviet countries, including their higher standards of living and less totalitarian governments. On top of these, the continuing dominance of capitalism in the West and its rise in former Eastern bloc countries starkly undercut Marx’s theory of historical materialism (see generally Marx, 1859/1904). Indeed, the notion that workers under capitalism will, as the forces of production progress, throw off their shackles through revolution has come to seem, if not quite ridiculous, then certainly extremely unlikely. Yet many of the insights of Marxian feminists and of Marxism itself are segregable from these aspects of Marx’s theories and, as I argue here, offer real insight for feminism today. The question for contemporary feminism, as I see it, is not how to hasten the Marxist revolution, but how to think through what changes in the market system are needed to further the feminist revolution.5

The section “U.S. Feminism’s Labor Market Bias” begins by setting out a very partial intellectual history of second-wave feminism in the United States, focusing on what Gwendolyn Mink has described as U.S. feminism’s “labor market bias” (Mink, 1998, p. 26). This history is not intended to be exhaustive; it focuses only on mainstream feminism’s convergence in the second wave on the narrow strategy of achieving gender parity in the unreconstructed workplace, without calling for broader restructuring of the market. This section then moves on to explore the costs of this narrow strategy for women today. It argues that although feminism’s labor-market push certainly has helped make significant gains for many women, it has also created significant costs. Women’s entry into the labor market, at the same time they maintain private homes and raise children to succeed in a market system, has put women on a metaphorical hamster wheel on which keeping up is exhausting and enervating. In addition, while helping to accomplish some movement toward equality in the workplace, this strategy has made still further progress on gender equality difficult to accomplish, as well as taken a toll on a range of other important goods, including women’s autonomy and well-being. Further, I show how the penalties for not keeping up on this hamster wheel are increasingly large, visited on increasingly more women, and are far from proportionately shared among women.

The section “What Has Been Left Out of the Mainstream Feminist Conversation: The Market and Market Ideology” draws selectively from both Marx and Marxian feminist analyses to consider what has been missing from mainstream feminism’s accounts that see labor market parity as the proper goal of feminism.6 I argue that these accounts have, to women’s
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detriment, failed to explore the range of disciplinary pressures that keep
women working long hours in jobs over which they may have little control
and are not engaged; reinforced the idealization of work in its paid and
unpaid forms over other kinds of activity and inactivity, including time for
contemplation; narrowly furthered the interests of women’s labor-market
parity at the expense of women’s autonomy, self-fulfillment, and well-being;
and have unnecessarily pitted the interests of working-class women against
those of middle-class women.

Finally, the section “Toward Market-Cautious Feminism” sketches out
the outlines of a “market-cautious feminism” that responds to the deficits
of unrestrained capitalism for women. This version of feminism, I argue,
must seek significant reforms to the free-market system in concert with
seeking gender parity in paid work. It must also seek to reconstruct the
way in which work – both paid and unpaid – is distributed and valued in
our society. In doing so, it calls for feminists to put the market in its appro-
priate place: as a vehicle that supports women’s equality and well-being,
rather than as the central focus and purpose of women’s lives.

One note on methodology before I begin: In recent decades, the uses
of the terms “woman” and “women” as descriptive categories have been
contested by theorists on a number of grounds. Some critics have pointed
out that what has often been presented as a unitary category falsely gener-
alizes across other dimensions of social identity, attributing to “women”
what is true only for women of a certain class, race, and historical period.
An overlapping group of critics has pointed out that some uses of these
terms present these categories as if they are prepolitical, ahistorical, and
not susceptible to change, or have glossed over the intense contestations
over their meanings taking place in contemporary Western society. Finally,
still other critics have argued for abandoning the use of these terms in their
entirety on the ground that their use continually recreates and reinforces
the supposed reality of gender, rather than exposes it for the discursive
fiction it is.

This paper takes the position that gender, although a discursive fiction
that is inherently unstable and contested, and while always intertwined
with other axes of power, remains an important (albeit not the only impor-
tant) axis of power in our society that affects the lived reality of humans,
constructed as women and men. In the case of the market pressures dis-
cussed in this paper, while there are certainly considerable variations
among women of different racial, ethnic, and class lines to which attention
must be paid, there are also some significant similarities across women
in these groups. To fail to attend to these similarities would hinder
pinpointing the standards and practices that perpetuate gender inequality. Accordingly, this paper seeks to explore the pressures that harm women across different axes of power, as well as the ways these pressures differentially affect disparate groups of women. In doing so, it seeks to keep in focus the ways in which generalizations about women as a group are provisional and culturally circumscribed, and to foster movement toward the blurring of gender categories.

U.S. FEMINISM’S LABOR MARKET BIAS

Arriving at the Goal of Labor Market Parity: The Feminine Mystique and Second-Wave Feminism

The genesis of second-wave feminism is often dated back to Betty Friedan’s 1963 opus, The Feminine Mystique. In it, Friedan focused on what she called “the problem that has no name,” meaning the silent question, “Is this all?,” that the suburban housewife asks herself as she tends house, drives carpool, and runs household errands (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 57). Friedan attributed American women’s malaise to the circumscribing of their lives to the limited role of housewife. This, she contended, denied women the uniquely human capacity “to transcend the present, to live one’s life by purposes stretching into the future – to live not at the mercy of the world, but as a builder and designer of that world” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 432). Fulfilling that capacity, for Friedan, was possible for women only if they took on challenging endeavors such as those that demanded “the lifelong commitment to art or science, to politics or profession” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 476). To do so, women must find “work that is of real value to society – work for which, usually, our society pays” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 474).

Although Friedan urged women into the paid workplace, she was at the same time surprisingly clear-sighted about some of the drawbacks of the current labor market. She recognized that, as currently structured, “the work of most American men, on the assembly lines or in corporation offices” did not provide adequate use of the human capacities that women should seek to exercise (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 356). The result was that the men holding these jobs were simply “punching a time clock,” an experience that left them with a “vacant, empty need for escape – television, tranquility, alcohol, sex” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 356).
Friedan also recognized that the market can generate inflated demands for material goods that contribute to women’s circumscribed societal role:

Why is it never said that the really crucial function, the really important role that women serve as housewives is to buy more things for the house. In all the talk of femininity and woman’s role, one forgets that the real business of America is business. But the perpetuation of housewifery, the growth of the feminine mystique, makes sense (and dollars) when one realizes that women are the chief customers of American business. Somehow, somewhere, someone must have figured out that women will buy more things if they are kept in the underused, nameless-yearning, energy-to-get-rid-of state of being housewives ... Properly manipulated ... American housewives can be given the sense of identity, purpose, creativity, the self-realization, even the sexual joy they lack – by the buying of things. (Friedan, 1963/2010, pp. 299, 301, italics in original)

Friedan staunchly asserted that the material payoffs of capitalism were not adequate recompense for the straitened roles that it imposed on women. In her words: “I do not accept the answer that there is no problem because American women have luxuries that women in other times and lands never dreamed of ... And women who think [the problem] will be solved by more money, a bigger house, a second car, moving to a better suburb often discover it gets worse” (1963/2010, p. 71). Yet except for urging women into the workforce, Friedan offered no strategy to undermine the strong link between women’s household roles and standards of consumption.

As a number of commentators have pointed out, Friedan’s exhorting women into the paid workplace was deeply raced and classed (Hooks, 1984, pp. 1–2; Tong, 2009, p. 28). First, her framing of the problem for feminism in terms of women being cloistered in the household itself reflects a white, middle-class perspective. As historian Robert Self recounts, at the inception of second-wave feminism, “[f]or middle-class women, the problem was forced domesticity and denial of access to the market;” in contrast, “[f]or working-class women, the problem was forced market labor and the denial of full-time domesticity” (Self, 2012, pp. 22, 23).

Second, given her recognition that most existing jobs could not provide the fulfillment that women (and men) require, Friedan’s strategy would benefit only those educated, middle-class women like herself who might get hired in exceptional jobs. Other women would, like their male counterparts, be stuck in the jobs that Friedan declared deadening; indeed, many of these women already worked such jobs. In bell hooks’ words, Friedan “did not tell readers whether it was more fulfilling to be a maid, a babysitter, a factory worker, a clerk, or a prostitute than to be a leisure-class housewife” (hooks, 1984, p. 2).
Third, Friedan’s strategy depended on working-class women, many of them non-white, being available to assume the care work for which middle-class women lacked the time to handle once they entered the paid workforce (Roberts, 1997, pp. 76–79). Indeed, Friedan herself hired such help when she went back to work (Horowitz, 1998, p. 170). In the same vein, in The Feminine Mystique, Friedan praised a woman who spent her salary on a three-day-a-week cleaning woman so that she could work, while she criticized another woman who refused to hire help and eventually quit her job in exhaustion (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 478). Yet those women who assumed the role of paid household help would, of course, themselves be deprived of the kind of fulfilling careers that Friedan argued that women needed. For those women who wanted or needed to join the paid workplace but could not afford household help, Friedan offered only the not-overly-helpful advice that they should “see housework for what it is – not a career, but something that must be done as quickly and efficiently as possible” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 469).

Much of second-wave feminism in Friedan’s aftermath adopted her positive program of urging women into the workplace, but without absorbing even her fledgling critique of American capitalism. As a result, whereas Friedan sought to urge women into only those jobs that used their full capacities, much feminism that followed defined success simply in terms of women’s obtaining jobs on a par with their male counterparts. The more substantive vision of women’s lives that Friedan sought to further was lost in the blinkered quest for wage and job parity. In its less moderate form, this quest for labor-market parity took the form of Linda Hirshman arguing that women who do not work full-time are letting feminism down (Hirshman, 2005). Hirshman advised young women that they should not work less than full-time, should not seek job accommodations for children, and should have no more than one child so that their domestic lives did not overly impede their work lives (Hirshman, 2006). In its more moderate form, Sheryl Sandberg recently exhorted women to “reignite the revolution” by “leaning in” to the work world without calling for any institutional changes on the part of business (Sandberg, 2013, p. 11).

To the extent that feminists today seek to justify labor-market parity as feminism’s goal, they conceptualize the labor market both instrumentally as a means for women to gain financial clout on a par with men and intrinsically as a means to self-fulfillment. In this latter mode of theorizing, the sphere of work, following Friedan, is often portrayed as a place of freedom that allows the high expression of women’s human capacities. In contrast to Friedan, however, there is generally no exploration of the downsides of
the market system that women are urged to enter, beyond the complaint that it is not adequately family friendly.

Beginning in the 1980s and picking up steam in the 1990s, some feminists, including myself, pushed back against U.S. feminism’s labor-market bias (Eichner, 2010; Fineman, 2004; McClain, 2006; Tronto, 1993). These feminists emphasized the importance and rewards of families, and called for a more positive revaluation of the activities of homemaking and caretaking. In doing so, writers of this ilk, in contrast with some mainstream feminists, recognized the danger of using the market as the relevant measure of societal value. Even so, market-centric views of the world tended to creep into these accounts: Some arguments in support of care work devolved into claims that it should be compensated because it was necessary to reproduce replacement workers for the market. Some accounts (and I count my own among these, see Eichner, 2010), in positing the value of domestic work against waged work, failed to contest the over-value of work (in either waged or unwaged forms) that arose with capitalism, and to assert the worth of nonwork activities like leisure. Further, most of these accounts failed to consider the effects of capitalism on the domestic sphere (but see Tronto, 2013).

The Results of the Second-Wave’s Push for Labor-Market Parity

The legacy of second-wave feminism, if its goal is construed solely in terms of gender parity in the workplace, has been largely, albeit not completely, positive. On the plus side, between 1975 and 2012, the percentage of U.S. women in the workforce with children under the age of six years grew from 39% to 64% (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Women with children between the ages of 6 and 17 increased their workforce participation from 55% in 1975 to 75% in 2012 (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Further, women’s pay rose from about 60% of men’s pay in 1960 to 76.5% in 2012—a substantial increase (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).

Yet on the negative side, the increase in women’s labor-force participation has largely stalled since the mid-1990s (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008, table 7; Coontz, 2013). And this participation has become increasingly stratified by class. Single mothers have continued to increase their participation in paid work, probably because of
the weakening of the American safety net and heightened work requirements for welfare benefits (Fang & Keane, 2004; Hoffman, 2009; see also Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 1996). At the same time, married women with young children have actually reduced their workforce participation rates in recent years, as more women who can afford to do so have left the workplace (Coontz, 2013; Hoffman, 2009). As a consequence, other countries have overtaken the United States in women's workforce participation: While in 1990, the United States ranked 6th in female labor participation among 22 wealthy countries, by 2010, we had fallen to 17th place (Blau & Kahn, 2013).

The increasingly bimodal pattern in women’s workforce participation should be troubling for those who read Friedan closely. Given that the percentage of single mothers who have college degrees is roughly half that of married mothers, and single mothers who work earn significantly less than married mothers who work, it is unlikely that most single mothers work in jobs that Friedan would believe furthered their human potential (Halpin, 2013). In fact, 62% of single mothers are employed in retail or service industries, which tend to be low skill and less secure jobs, and to have fewer benefits and be less flexible than other jobs. Further, single mothers tend to be underrepresented in management and professional positions (Chang & Mason, 2010, p. 14).

Indeed, even looking at women’s workforce participation as a whole, it is difficult to see this participation as fulfilling Friedan’s goal. Many women who are working for pay are performing the same care work that Friedan urged women to leave in favor of more creative work; only now these women, disproportionately women of color and immigrant women, are performing this work for other families with working mothers, usually for inadequate pay.8 In contrast to Friedan’s arguing that paid work would allow more “to live not at the mercy of the world, but as a builder and designer of the world” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 432), a 2012 Gallup survey of employee engagement revealed that only 30% of employees of both sexes stated that they were “engaged” in their work, where engagement was defined as involved, enthusiastic, and committed to their work (Gallup, 2013). Fifty-two percent of workers were found to be “not engaged.” Another 18% were deemed to be “actively disengaged” in their work (Gallup, 2013).

The fact that married mothers have increasingly left the labor market is at least partly the product of Friedan underestimating the difficulties of combining work and family as both institutions are currently structured (Hoffman, 2009; see also Blau & Kahn, 2013). Friedan was asking
American housewives to join a workplace in which workers are expected to work significantly more hours than in other wealthy countries. The 1,966 hours that the average American worker works annually amounts to roughly 10 more weeks a year of work than Swedish workers (1,552 hours), and significantly more hours worked than in France (1,656), Germany (1,560), Canada (1,732 hours), and the United Kingdom (1,731) (Gornick & Meyers, 2005, p. 59). This means that even in the countries at the higher end of the scale, like Canada and the United Kingdom, full-time employees work roughly the equivalent of six fewer weeks a year than their American counterparts (Gornick & Meyers, 2005, p. 59). There are countries in which workers work more hours on average than Americans, but these countries – the Philippines, Taiwan, Chile, Mexico, Poland, and Hungary – are much poorer than the United States (Medalia & Jacobs, 2008).

The result of women joining the American workplace, with its demand of long hours, is that two-earner families in which both parents work full-time on average spend a total of 82.7 hours a week at their jobs (Medalia & Jacobs, 2008, table 6.3). Particularly, remarkable is the high percentage of American couples who work very long hours. Almost two-thirds of American couples with children in which both parents work full-time report total work hours each week of 80 hours or more (Medalia & Jacobs, 2008, table 6.3). Even more startling, 19% of dual-earner couples with children work more than 100 hours a week (Medalia & Jacobs, 2008, table 6.3). No wealthy Western European country approaches that figure. By way of contrast, the relevant comparison figure in the Netherlands is 1.2% (Medalia & Jacobs, 2008, table 6.3).

And these figures take into account only the paid hours that Americans work, without taking into account their unpaid hours. In 1989, Arlie Hochschild coined the term “the second shift” to describe the situation of women who, after working all day in the paid workplace, came home to put dinner on the table and deal with the other childrearing and household tasks that they used to have the entire day to perform (Hochschild & Machung, 1989/2003, p. 7). Hochschild’s book circulated widely among U.S. feminists because its description of these women’s exhaustion broadly resonated: “These women talked about sleep the way a hungry person talks about food” (Hochschild & Machung, 1989/2003, p. 9). Indeed, today mothers who work full-time have a combined total workload of 68 hours a week when paid and unpaid work are taken into account. That is, incredibly, a workload that is close to 10 hours a day seven days a week (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006, pp. 116–117). And for families headed by single mothers, particularly those who cannot afford to pay to transfer some
household responsibilities to others, the total workload is still higher (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 55, table 3.4). It should be no surprise, then, that 71% of married mothers and 78% of single mothers report that they have too little free time for themselves (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 135). Further, 46% of employed mothers report always feeling rushed — more than twice as many as mothers who are homemakers when background factors are controlled for (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 137). It is no wonder that 3 in 10 American women state that they use sleep medication at least three times a week, and 80% of American women report that stress is the trigger for their sleeplessness (Paul, 2011).

Yet it turns out that, contrary to Hochschild’s assumption, it is not just women who are working long hours: Time-study data show that their husbands, too, are exhausted. Although married men do not perform as much household work as their wives do, these men make up for it by spending more hours in paid work. Adding both paid and unpaid work together, women and men in dual-earner families work almost equally long hours: In middle-class families where both parents work full-time, the combined total workload of paid and unpaid work is 135 hours a week, with men working 67 hours to women’s 68 hours (Bianchi et al., 2006, pp. 116–117). While men certainly get the benefit of having more economic clout because they earn more pay, it is hard to attribute women’s long hours of work — both paid and unpaid — solely to what early second-wave feminists would have called the forces of “patriarchy,” given the very long hours that fathers, too, are working. In investigating the cause of women’s exhaustion, it may, accordingly, be time to turn attention to the direct and indirect pressures associated with the free-market system — what early second-wave feminists would have called “capitalism.”

Indeed, while women’s entry into the workplace resulted in some gains for women’s equality, the big winner may well be capitalism. Women’s movement into paid work in the past decades was not nearly offset by men’s comparable reduction in hours of paid work. In 1965, married mothers with children worked an average of six paid hours per week; by 2000, they worked 23.8 hours a week (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 55). During that same period, married fathers decreased their hours much less than women’s rose: from 47.8 to 42.5 (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 55). As a consequence, the total paid workload of two-parent families increased by 12.5 hours per week (Bianchi et al., 2006, pp. 48–53; Hout & Hanley, 2002, p. 11; Jacobs & Gerson, 2001). In short, women’s entry into the workforce resulted in a massive transfer of the hours of family members into paid work from other spheres of life.
So why do American men and women work so many hours? Undoubtedly this is a complicated question that implicates a complex mix of factors. It is also an important question for feminists to explore, given both its relevance to achieving labor-market parity and its relevance for deciding if labor-market parity adequately ensures women’s freedom and well-being. Feminists thus far have considered one limited, albeit important, reason for the extensive hours required in the American workplace: the fact that the United States has failed to pass adequate work-family reconciliation laws, including paid family leave, universal day care, and so forth. It is certainly true that Americans generally have fewer legal protections to limit the hours they work than workers in other wealthy countries, particularly European countries (Eichner, 2010; Gornick & Heron, 2006; Gornick & Meyers, 2005), and that this increases employees’ work hours, as well as decreases women’s workforce participation rates (Blau & Kahn, 2013). Yet to focus only on the lack of work-family reconciliation laws overlooks a large portion of the complex mix of factors that contribute to this phenomenon.

Over and above the effects of the absence of work-family protection policies, the general paucity of labor market protections for workers in the United States — including the absence of job security and the minimal unemployment benefits that are paid to eligible recipients — has created a culture of insecurity that pressures employees to work long and hard. Vacation time provides a prime example of this phenomenon. Employers offer American workers significantly less vacation time than do employers in other advanced countries — the United States’ average is two weeks per year, compared to four to six weeks in other advanced countries where vacation is guaranteed by law (Gornick & Meyers, 2005). Yet despite their comparatively meager vacation allotment, a large portion of American workers do not take all of their vacation time. One study conducted in 2010 found that only 57% of American workers took all of their available leave; in contrast, 89% of French workers took all their vacation time (Reuters/Ipsos Poll, 2010). As economist Richard Freeman observed (2007, p. 60), employees are significantly more likely to take less vacation time the more insecure they feel on the job.9 Given worker’s increased sense of job insecurity since the 2008 recession, it is unsurprising that employees are working more hours than in the past (Saad, 2013).

The drive to work long hours for higher pay has been further spurred on by the strong consumerist culture in the United States, which has only strengthened since Friedan commented on it a half century ago. This culture has been driven by the ceaseless stream of marketing messages that
barrages American citizens, including young children, from early in the
morning to late in the evening (Schor, 1993, 1998). It has also been sup-
ported by the mushrooming economic inequality in the United States since
the 1970s (Hacker & Pierson, 2010), as citizens take notice that the Jones’s
have far more consumer goods (flat-screen plasma televisions, iPads, big
houses, luxury cars) than they do, and feel the need to keep up with them
(Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013, pp. 10–11).

To add to the exhaustion of many American workers, American parents
now spend significantly more time-performing childcare than they have in
the past (Bianchi et al., 2006). Between 1965 and 2000, the hours that mar-
rried mothers spent in which childrearing was their primary activity rose,
despite their increased work hours, from an average of 10.6 hours to 12.9
hours per week (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 64). During that same period, mar-
rried fathers’ hours with their children more than doubled to 6.5 hours a
week, up from 2.6 hours a week (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 64). Single
mothers, too, reported an increase in child-care hours to 11.8 hours a week,
up from 7.5 hours in 1965 (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 64). While for married
fathers, a large portion of this increase involved them performing routine
childcare activities that they had not in the past, for married mothers, this
increase was largely focused on an increase of time engaged in interacting
with their children (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 64).

Yet for American parents to spend an increased amount of time focused
on their children in addition to the increased hours American parents spend
at work, they now spend significantly less time doing housework, cooking,
and helping sick or elderly relatives, or alone with their spouses. They also
spend less time in leisure activities like reading and visiting with friends
(Amato, 2007; Bianchi et al., 2006, pp. 95–96). For married mothers, but
not fathers, they also have less free time overall than they had in the 1960s,
and spend less time volunteering and pursuing hobbies (Bianchi et al.,
2006, p. 97; Freeman, 2007, p. 61).10 Among other consequences, some
research suggests that this has caused Americans’ social circles to narrow,
and their social networks to shrink (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears,
2006, pp. 357–358).11 Not only does such narrowing affect the quality of life
of those adults whose social circles have narrowed, it also harms the well-
being of communities, which lack the benefits of engaged citizens and the
social trust that accompanies such involvement (Putnam, 2000).

To summarize thus far, women’s entry into the labor market has
resulted in some real gains for sex equality. Yet progress toward full equal-
ity has been stalled by the U.S. workplace’s heavy demands. Further, the
gains that women have made as a result of entering the workplace, as it is
currently structured, have been accompanied by significant costs that also
deserve attention. Many of the women entering this untransformed market
did not get the rewarding jobs that Friedan extolled as fulfilling their
human potential; in fact, a number of them, disproportionately non-white,
now perform care work for other women who work, usually for inadequate
pay. Many of these women, as well as the women they work for, feel con-
sistently tired and stressed. Further, working mothers (and fathers) have
emptied out other sectors of their life outside of work and parenting, with
problematic consequences that include decreased civic participation.

While mainstream U.S. feminism has done much to analyze the ways in
which the construction of gender restricts women’s lives, it has done far
less to consider how capitalism restricts women’s lives. Further, while there
has been a considerable amount of discussion from feminists about how
gender roles keep women in thrall to their husband and children, there has
been much less discussion of the forces that keep women in thrall to the
market. Indeed, mainstream feminism’s urging women into the market
without pressing for deeper market reforms may have, as Nancy Fraser
argues, made it an unwitting accomplice to the rise of neoliberalism in the
United States (Fraser, 2013).12 It is time to reconsider U.S. feminism’s goal of
labor-market parity in the existing workplace, and to reevaluate feminism’s
relationship to the market.

WHAT HAS BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE MAINSTREAM
FEMINIST CONVERSATION: THE MARKET AND
MARKET IDEOLOGY

How might feminism conceptualize the forces associated with the market in
a more nuanced way, both recognizing, as mainstream feminism has done in
the past, the possibilities that the market creates for women, but also
the way that market forces and ideology constrain women, as well as make
their quest for equality more difficult? We do not need to start from scratch.
Marxian feminists early in the second wave conducted a vigorous discussion
of the free-market system. While some parts of their analyses have not fared
well with the passage of time, others offer important insights for theorizing
the contemporary relationship between feminism and capitalism. In this
section, I consider several of these insights, supplemented by newer theoriza-
tions of the effects of capitalism (e.g., Himmelweft, 1995; Weeks, 2011), and
discuss how they might contribute to the current conversation.
Capitalism as a Disciplinary System

In the Labor Market
Friedan and the second-wave feminists who followed her did an excellent job exploring the ways in which the gender roles that left women excluded from many paid jobs and in many cases cloistered inside the home – roles that had before been attributed to either women’s nature, their affection for their families, or their personal choices – were actually the product of social forces that constrained women in various ways; this is what made the analogy between these restrictions and a birdcage such a helpful one (see Frye, 1983). Other second-wave feminists who followed also thoroughly analyzed the interconnections between the unpaid labor women perform and their secondary place in the labor market (see, e.g., Benston, 1969; Dalla Costa & James, 1972; Oakley, 1974). In doing so, these feminists pointed out that women’s activities in the home, although traditionally coded as “nonwork,” are in fact hard work, integral to the functioning of society, as well as necessary to the functioning of the labor market through both supporting current workers and providing replacement workers for the market. Certainly, these were much-needed interventions given the patriarchal ideals that reigned at the beginning of the second-wave era.

Yet even today, mainstream feminists have less thoroughly explored the range of social and economic forces that push women into paid labor, and long hours of it, that constrain their work roles, and that organize the labor market hierarchically and in the interests of employers and stock holders rather than women and their families. Instead, mainstream feminism, following Friedan, has generally treated the sphere of paid work primarily as a sphere of freedom and self-fulfillment, in which women could be free of the domestic constraints in which they had been so long confined. The failure to focus on these forces risks confining women to yet another realm, yet again based on the false notion that their confinement represents personal choice, fulfillment of their destiny, or some hard-wired law that paid work should be a central point of adult human lives.

Even some of the most textured depictions of paid work in feminist theory have too uncritically accepted the notion that there is something inherently virtuous about work for pay. I have already described Betty Friedan’s statement that the uniquely human capacity “to transcend the present, to live one’s life by purposes stretching into the future – to live not at the mercy of the world, but as a builder and designer of that world” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 432) could best be fulfilled for women through their finding paid work (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 474). Vicki Schultz similarly valorizes
work in her article “Life’s Work” (2000). Schultz eloquently responds to
feminist proposals for structuring society in ways that would make paid
work less important with a rousing defense of the value of paid work:

In my view, a robust conception of equality can be best achieved through paid work,
rather than despite it. Work is a site of deep self-formation that offers rich opportu-
nities for human flourishing (or devastation). To a large extent, it is through our work –
how it is defined, distributed, characterized, and controlled – that we develop into the
“men” and “women” we see ourselves and others see us as being. Because law’s domain
includes work and its connection to other spheres of existence, the prospect of who we
become as a society, and as individuals, is shaped profoundly by the laws that create and
control the institutions that govern our experiences as workers. I believe that it is only by
recognizing the formative power of such forces that we can imagine and invent ourselves
as full human agents. (2000, p. 1883)

Schultz also quotes Studs Terkel’s oral history of working people for the
proposition that paid work is about a search “for daily meaning as well as
daily bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than
torpor; in short, for a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday
sort of dying” (Schultz, 2000, p. 1892) (quoting Terkel, 1974).

Schultz, like Friedan, recognizes that many jobs are not structured in a
manner that lets workers expand their horizons or allow workers to experi-
ence meaning and satisfaction. Further, in contrast to Friedan, Schultz
includes a call to improve work for workers alongside her call for women
to get paid work (2000, p. 1884). Both, however, fail adequately to interro-
gate the assumption that paid work should be the, or at least a, central
focus of most or all adults’ lives and a primary means through which they
forge their identity, find daily meaning, contribute to building a better
world, seek to make one’s mark on the future, and join together with
others. It is no doubt true that paid work is today a prerequisite for social
citizenship. It is also true that some work – including a substantial amount
of work that is currently paid and much that is unpaid – is socially neces-
sary and beneficial for our continued lives as a community. It is far more
contestable, however, that paid work should continue to assume as central
a focus in citizens’ lives, and continue to be so central to their identity, to
the measure of value placed on them, and the major way that citizens join
with one another, contribute to society, and make their mark on the future.
Indeed, the focus on paid work to fill these voids speaks to the paucity of
spheres outside of paid work to develop oneself, find meaning, join with
others, and to help build and design the future world outside of paid work.
Furthermore, the focus on work for pay as a means to fill this void says
much about the inability of even some of our most imaginative thinkers to
escape the grip of using the market as the measure for value. In a restructured world, while some adults may find their passion kindled by paid work, might many adults choose to work the minimum amount possible and make a contribution to society in other ways, through making public art, writing poetry, or working in a community garden?

The work of Marxian feminists early in the second wave helps to construct a more balanced conceptualization of the forces at play in the labor market. These feminists recognized, importantly, that the labor market, like the domestic sphere, is a realm shot through with power relations. Thus, in her 1983 book Money, Sex, and Power, Nancy Hartsock recounted Marx’s description in Capital of the power dynamics associated with the labor contract. Marx began by seeking to debunk the standard, classical economic description of the labor contract as a voluntary agreement between equals, one of whom freely sells labor power, the other of whom agrees to buy it. In this view of the labor contract, as Marx describes it in the language of free-market proponents, both work together “to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all” (Marx, 1867/1906, p. 195). To show us the lie in this rosy depiction of the labor contract, Marx suggested we move,

[a]ccompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of labour-power, [from] this noisy sphere [of the marketplace in which the labor exchange supposedly occurs], where everything takes place on the surface and in [full] view of all men, and follow them both into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there stares us in the face “No admittance except on business.” (Marx, 1867/1906, p. 195)

Viewed inside the workplace, Marx tells us, the “physiognomy of our dramatis personae” changes so that they no longer appear as equals (Marx, 1867/1906, p. 196). Instead, “the money owner, now strides, in front as capitalist; the possessor of labor power follows as his laborer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market, and has nothing to expect but a hiding” (Marx, 1867/1906, p. 196). By changing the reader’s focus from the supposed free-market exchange to the realm of the workplace itself, Marx sought to expose the way in which the wage contract, although generally conceived to sound in free will and equality, in truth creates a relationship of command and control.

Hartsock recounted Marx’s description of the capitalist-worker relationship to point out that Marx himself does not tell us the whole story of the male worker’s relationship with power. To do that, Hartsock explains, we need to follow the worker home where, just as it does when entering the
workplace, the worker’s demeanor again changes completely: The worker “now strides in front, while a third person, not specifically present in Marx’s account of the transactions between capitalist and worker (both of whom are male), follows timidly behind, carrying groceries, baby, and diapers” (Hartsock, 1983, p. 234). In this way, Hartsock pointed out that although Marx properly attended to relations of domination in the paid workplace, he overlooked these same relations in the home. Mainstream feminism has done the reverse of Hartsock: it has amply described the wife’s subordination to her husband but not the subordination in the worker’s relationship to her boss. Both need to be accounted for in any theory that seeks the emancipation of women. As Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James put it in their 1972 manifesto, “[s]lavery to an assembly line is not a liberation from slavery to a kitchen sink” (Dalla Costa & James, 1972, p. 35). Instead, contemporary feminism needs to consider the extent to which women’s “second job outside of the home is another boss superimposed on the first” (Dalla Costa & James, 1972, p. 13).

While Marxian analyses of the power dynamics of the labor relationship help to complicate contemporary feminist analyses, they should not be incorporated wholesale. The labor market of the twenty-first century is not the same as the market of the nineteenth century that Marx was describing, on some number of counts. Our hours of work, even if long, are shorter than they once were; working conditions are safer; the social safety net is better than it was, albeit presently decreasing in size; and the market has a far broader professional and managerial class than it once did, which has allowed many workers a significant amount of professional autonomy. Further, conceptions of the way that power operates have changed considerably since Marx’s time, and even since the time of early second-wave feminists. While both Marx and Marxian feminists presaged post-structuralists in recognizing the way that specific social and economic contexts can shape the consciousness of citizens, molding their desires and shaping their framework of daily life in ways that foreclosed them from asking certain questions (Jaggar, 1983, pp. 56–67; Marx, 1867/1906), following Foucault, we are more aware of the discursive aspects of power (Foucault, 1975).

Concomitantly, we are aware that such discourses, because they circulate through multiple processes and locations, are neither monolithic nor totalizing. We also recognize that because one of the ways that power operates is through creating subjects who have some sense of themselves as agents, these subjects have the potential to reinterpret dominant social scripts in ways that are resistant.
Applying this updated conception of power to the contemporary workplace suggests the limitations with conceptualizing the workplace as either completely totalizing, as Marxian thought would indicate, or as liberatory, as mainstream feminism would suggest. Both the disciplinary aspects and liberatory aspects of the workplace need to be attended to, and different workplaces and jobs will differ significantly on these features. U.S. feminism going forward therefore needs to better attend to the ways that paid work, even as it frees women from conceptualizing their roles only as housewives, also constrains them and restricts the shape of their lives in other ways. It must also recognize that the factors that impelled women’s movement into the labor market are not solely positive factors associated with the loosening of gender roles and women’s drive for independence and equality, but also a complex mix of economic and social factors, some of which should be considered troubling. These include a combination of government and social policies that generally dictate that all adults work paid jobs and long hours, unless they have an independent source of income or have a partner who works. They also include the decrease of real wages earned by men since the 1970s, which have caused some women to enter the workforce simply in order to retain their families’ standard of living rather than as an exercise of agency (Coontz, 2014; Mishel, Bivens, Gould, & Shierholz, 2012)."14"

Mainstream feminism must also take into account that the work accomplished in the contemporary workplace is, for a great number of women, not the rewarding experience that Friedan urged for women. Certainly, a number of women – particularly professional women – experience their jobs as rewarding and as a good use of their capacities. Yet, as the labor market is currently constructed, this is not true for a great number of women, and is particularly untrue for women in less-skilled jobs, including factory workers, fast-food workers, and maids. In these types of jobs, workers not only do not have the ability to exercise creativity or initiative, they are often subjected to unpleasant working conditions, required to perform tedious, repetitive work, and must work irregular hours for inadequate pay.

In addition, feminism must begin to recognize that for all workers, even those who find their jobs rewarding, the workplace should not be conceptualized as a sphere free from hierarchy or constraint. Regardless of the type of job they hold, most workers serve at the pleasure of their employer and must follow his or her dictates. Employers usually set the hours, choose with whom the employee will work, and determine the pace of work. This means that employees spend great parts of their lives on
a mission set out by their employers rather than autonomously setting the terms of how they accomplish their tasks themselves. While these features should not cause feminism to overlook that waged work brings more economic power to women and gives them, at least in some cases, the opportunity to gain skills and to stretch their horizons, these features should cause feminism to stop presenting gender-parity in the workplace as a panacea for women. The goal of feminist theory should more accurately be to assess the current workplace for women, as well as to figure out ways to get women better work and more control over their work situation.

In the Home
Marxian feminists’ discussion of the power dynamics associated with capitalism also helps round out mainstream feminism’s theorization of the family (see Eichner, 2010; Tronto, 1993). In The Feminine Mystique, Friedan began to broach some issues relating to capitalism’s influence on families, but these issues have largely lain fallow with contemporary feminists. Indeed, some feminists who have sought to recover the value of families and care work in response to second-wave feminism’s lauding the value of paid work have, despite the merit of these feminists’ larger project, mistakenly theorized families as a place of freedom and affection removed from both the labor market and market forces.

Marxian feminist thought offers a helpful corrective in seeing the family as an integral part of the capitalist system. In this system, a significant purpose of family is to maintain the existing workforce, as well as produce the future workforce. In the words of Rosalind Petchesky:

“Production” and “reproduction,” work and the family, far from being separate territories … are really intimately related modes that reverberate upon one another … Not only do reproduction and kinship, or the family, have their own, historically determined, products, material techniques, mores or organization and power relationships, but reproduction and kinship are themselves integrally related to the social relations of production and the state. (Petchesky, 1979, p. 376)

Families are also part of the capitalist system insofar as they serve as consumers in capitalism’s production—consumption cycle, in which new production stimulates new consumer needs, which in turn stimulates new developments in production (Jaggar, 1983, p. 74). In this view, the domestic sphere is not untainted by market forces; instead it is infused by desires, demands, and cultural norms related to the market. This complicated interrelationship between work and families, as Kathi Weeks counsels, should cause feminists to resist perceiving “work as a site of coercion and
regimentation and the family as a freely invented site of authentic and purely voluntary relations” (Weeks, 2011, p. 129).

Tracing these Marxian feminists’ insights out in the contemporary United States lets us build on Friedan’s important recognition that some of what make homemaking and caretaking so time consuming and so expensive in the United States are shared ideas of what a home should look like and how families should function that have been perpetuated by the marketing messages that barrage citizens in a virtually unending stream. The influence of these messages has penetrated American households and raised the bar for Americans’ standards of consumption far above comfortably meeting material needs. Economic inequality aggravates these heightened standards, as the lifestyles of the economically successful set the standard for others. This in turn sends more adults — now, both men and women — into the workplace for longer hours to meet this inflated living standard (Himmelweit, 1995, pp. 10–11). The association between home and material goods also makes homemaking far more time consuming. Not only does it require significant time to shop for the necessary accoutrements of family life, including the Pottery Barn placemats and table runners that say “home” and the video cameras to record children’s athletic games, it also takes significant time for the home and its burgeoning equipment to be maintained, and the newly purchased scrapbooks to be filled with pictures from digital cameras.

Feminists should also recognize that the market system has a pervasive influence on the ways that families structure their family lives. American parents, for example, are considerably less likely to eat dinner with their children regularly than parents in other wealthy countries (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2007, pp. 22–24).¹⁵ And, as noted above, they also take far less family leave and vacation time than do parents in other countries because of work demands (Freeman, 2007, p. 60; Reuters/Ipsos Poll, 2010).

While childrearing is sometimes depicted as a natural process, it too is shot through with the effects of capitalism. Market pressures are intertwined more deeply than just through parents’ conceptions that they must provide particular clothes, toys, and vacations for their children in order to be good parents. American childrearing has become, to some considerable extent, organized around ensuring that children, as they approach adulthood, can successfully compete in an increasingly competitive society. Indeed, the increasing inequality spawned by the U.S. economic system may help explain why parents are spending more hours in childrearing despite working more hours in paid jobs (Bianchi et al., 2006,
The economic stakes of raising children have changed significantly during the course of the last few decades. With the demise of unions, getting a high-school degree will not assure young adults a life of economic security. Even a college education will not do it: assuming graduates can get a job at all, they certainly are no longer assured to have job benefits and an adequate pension upon retirement (Hacker & Pierson, 2010, pp. 28–31; Mishel et al., 2012, p. 228; Stone, Van Horn & Zukin, 2012). In fact, a recent study found that roughly 44% of working college graduates were underemployed, in the sense that their jobs did not require a college degree. Even more concerning, the share of underemployed jobs that are “good non-college jobs,” which pay at least $45,000 a year in today’s dollars, has declined from more than half of such jobs in 1990 to slightly over a third in 2012. During that same time, the share of “low-wage jobs,” defined as paying $25,000 a year or less in today’s dollars, has risen to about 20%, from roughly 15% (Weissman, 2014). No longer is being “pretty good” good enough to ensure that children will have a comfortable life. Parents may therefore be putting extra care into raising their kids to give their children a competitive edge when they compete for jobs.

This economic insecurity explains why the memoir Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother by Yale Law Professor Amy Chua struck such a cultural nerve in the United States (2011). In the book, Chua contrasted her “Chinese mother” parenting style with “Western parenting.” As Chua framed it, Chinese mothers push their children to succeed, which requires supervising them in endless, punishing hours of study and practice for school and for other activities deemed sufficiently resume-worthy and competitive to clearly separate the winners from the losers. In contrast, Chua contended, Western parents push their children less and are more inclined to accept a second-rate performance (Chua, 2011, p. 4). The reason that the memoir created a national furor was because it channeled the economic anxieties of contemporary American parenthood. In Chua’s story, children in American culture do not learn what it takes to win. Lurking in this narrative is the threat that they will wind up on the bottom. Also lurking is the fear that other countries (read Asian countries) will overtake the United States in the globalized economy, as their children have learned to be tougher than ours. In an economy that has become increasingly winner-take-all, and where the stakes of the competition are skewed to favor the very few over the many, parents are far more likely to obsess about turning their children into winners, a focus we are seeing increasingly today in the phenomenon referred to alternatively as “helicopter parenting” and “over-parenting” (Gibbs, 2009; Rettner, 2010; see also Hays, 1996).
Overvaluing Work as against the Rest of Life

Mainstream feminism has also tended to value both paid and unpaid work too uncritically as against the rest of women’s lives. Certainly, second-wave feminism’s lauding the virtues of wage work in response to women’s exclusion from that work made sense in historical context. The same is true for the response of those feminists who pointed out the importance of women’s unpaid caretaking, which, they made clear, was both valuable and also work. However, the net effect of this conversation has been to value the dignity and importance of work – in its paid and unpaid forms – against all other human activity and indeed inactivity, including civic involvement, social activities, leisure, and contemplation (Weeks, 2011). In doing so, feminism has failed to contest the emptying of women’s lives of all but work. And it has failed to identify the ways that a blinkered focus on work may constrain women’s freedom, may interfere with their well-being, and is tied to the workings of the free-market system.

In fact, while the activity of work is often taken unquestioningly both in mainstream feminism and mainstream American culture as, variously, a requirement of nature, as intrinsic to American culture, or as a matter of virtue, the truth of the American focus on work is far more complicated than that. Anthropologists and historians have demonstrated that the strong cultural emphasis placed on work is more closely associated with the onset of capitalism than it is with being an intrinsic part of the human condition or of American history (Sahlins, 1972; Sellers, 1991). Although people in precapitalist cultures certainly worked to sustain themselves, they generally did so only until they met their subsistence needs, and no further (Sahlins, 1972; Sellers, 1991). Despite Benjamin Franklin’s strong exhortations about the virtues of work, historians have shown that the Puritan work ethic, while part of the early culture of the Eastern seaboard merchant towns, was not shared by the great bulk of Americans until market society’s rise in the middle of the nineteenth century. Until that time, most Americans tended to work only as hard as they had to meet basic necessities, and valued leisure far more than work (Sellers, 1991). Only after the onset of market society did the work ethic became so closely intertwined with Americans’ ideological fabric – in part because this ethic was deliberately inculcated by early capitalists, whose interests it served (Sellers, 1991). As these employers recognized, such a work ethic would make it easier to maximize output from their employees, and was far more effective than either physical coercion or supervision in accomplishing this end. This work ethic is supported by the culture of capitalism. Obtaining consumer goods is equated with success, which requires working longer hours
to buy these goods. Activities performed for self-fulfillment or for altruistic reasons become squeezed out in order to make time for work and for consumption (Himmelweit, 1995, p. 11).

Some versions of Marxian feminism hew too closely to Marx’s focus on labor as the source of human dignity to offer a helpful corrective to U.S. feminism’s overvaluing of work. Yet the work of other Marxian feminists is more helpful in recognizing that the reasons that Americans work so hard, in Kathi Weeks’ words, stem from “a complex blend of coercion and choice, necessity and desire, habit and intention” (Weeks, 2011, p. 38). Particularly helpful are the earlier Marxian feminists who recognized that important goods are served by women working, including, in the case of paid work, women’s economic independence, but who did not romanticize work (in its paid and unpaid forms), or conceive participation in the paid workplace to be the endpoint of women’s freedom (Weeks, 2011). As Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James put it, “not one of us believes that emancipation, liberation, can be achieved through work. Work is still work, whether inside or outside the home … Slavery to an assembly line is not a liberation from slavery to a kitchen sink” (Dalla Costa & James, 1972, p. 35). For this reason, the pair rejected the mainstream feminist view that the path leading to women’s freedom ended in the waged workplace:

Up to now, the myth of female incapacity, rooted in this isolated woman dependent on someone else’s wage and therefore shaped by someone else’s consciousness, has been broken by only one action: the woman getting her own wage, breaking the back of personal economic dependence, making her own independent experience with the world outside the home, performing social labor in a socialized structure, whether the factory or the office, and initiating there her own forms of social rebellion along with the traditional forms of the class. The advent of the women’s movement is a rejection of this alternative. (Dalla Costa & James, 1972, p. 49, emphasis in original)

Indeed, Marx’s own work, despite over-privileging the role of labor in human lives, provides some helpful ways to think about the appropriate cabining of work in citizens’ lives. Marx helpfully distinguished between the realm of necessity, in which humans labor to perform what they must perform, and the realm of freedom, in which humans use their energy for other purposes. In Marx’s words:

[T]he realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production … Beyond [the realm of necessity] begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite. (Marx, 1894/1959, pp. 799–800)
Marx viewed the realm of freedom as curtailed for workers by capitalists who exploited them by requiring them to work far more than necessary to satisfy societal needs. Accordingly, even where the forces of production would permit an extensive realm of freedom, workers do not, under capitalism, have the opportunity to enjoy it (Jaggar, 1983, p. 209).

Contemporary feminist theory might profitably begin to (re)incorporate these Marxian insights by pushing back against the strong disciplinary forces, including in some strands of feminism, which suggest that one’s work (paid or unpaid) should be an important determinant of one’s value, or that work should occupy the bulk of one’s life. This is particularly true insofar as both the labor market and families are structured in ways that serve the ends of business far more than the ends of either employees or society. Feminism needs to recognize that the long hours of paid and unpaid work required in a society as wealthy as our own are not the result of nature, but are culturally constructed; at the same time, by virtue of them being incorporated into public policy, they have been made very real for many women. Accordingly, feminists should take action to recover for women more access to Marx’s realm of freedom. To do so, they should push hard to give workers the ability to reduce hours of paid work for more reasons than simply to parent, as well as push back against developing norms of intensive parenting. In tandem with this, feminism should encourage women to spend time outside of work or, to put this sentiment in the words of Sidney Aronowitz and his coauthors of the “Post-Work Manifesto,” to “get a life” (Aronowitz, Esposito, DiFazio, & Yard, 1998, p. 40).

Moving beyond Gender Parity

Mainstream feminism has also too narrowly drawn its vision of what a reformed society should look like by focusing only on achieving sex equality, conceived narrowly as women’s achieving economic parity in the workplace with men. I have already noted one key problem with the strategy of achieving gender parity in the workplace as it is currently constructed, namely that jobs are structured in a manner that precludes significant caretaking; this means that in our gender-structured society, and with our privileged family arrangements, it is women who pull back from complete attachment to the workplace. It is the remaining problems with the narrow gender-parity strategy that concern me here.
First, in seeking to eliminate gender hierarchy without seeking to redress the inequalities of class in the workplace and the rest of society, this strategy serves the needs of only the women whose male counterparts are relatively high up on the socioeconomic ladder. As bell hooks observed decades ago:

Women in lower class and poor groups, particularly those who are non-white, would not have defined women’s liberation as women gaining social equality with men since they are continually reminded in their everyday lives that all women do not share a common social status. Concurrently, they know that many males in their social groups are exploited and oppressed. Knowing that men in their groups do not have social, political, and economic power, they would not deem it liberatory to share their social status. (hooks, 1984, p. 18)

Second, even for these relatively privileged white women, the narrow strategy of gender parity with their male peers is increasingly less satisfactory than it was in the past. Hooks wrote in 1984, a time in which men as a group were doing substantially better than they are doing now: at that time, men with a high-school education could get expect to get union jobs that provided a living wage, benefits, job security, medical insurance, and a pension on retirement. All these things are now far from a sure thing for middle-class men, let alone working-class men (Hacker & Pierson, 2010; Madland, Walter, & Bunker, 2011; Mishel et al., 2012; Mishel & Shierholz, 2013). Given that men’s economic circumstances are less secure than in the past, the simple goal of women’s parity with their male counterparts is increasingly problematic. As I used to tell students in my feminist political theory class, feminism could achieve complete sex equality by killing everyone on the planet off; in that case, men and women would be completely equal – albeit dead. The point being, of course, that any vision of equality worth pursuing involves a richer notion of equality that lifts people up and increases their well-being and freedom, rather than simply enforces equality at a subpar level.

Friedan herself recognized that, given how the labor market was structured, getting women into a good portion of paid jobs would do them no favors. She believed that women needed to explore roles beyond the role of housewife, not simply for the sake of achieving parity with men, but in order to fulfill women’s human potential, which most jobs in the current economy would not allow. We need not agree with Friedan about what sorts of lives fulfill human potential to appreciate the point that the feminist vision of a restructured world should aim for more than parity with men in a workplace in which most men’s work hours are long, their wages in absolute terms are decreasing, their positions are insecure, and their work lives are generally neither interesting nor rewarding. It was not for nothing that the early name of second-wave feminism was “women’s liberation” rather than “sex equality.”
This brings me to my third point: Any feminist vision worth its salt must not only focus on gender parity, but also seek to increase women’s autonomy and well-being. A revised feminism should therefore recognize the complex relationship between the market and women’s autonomy, defined in terms of both the capacity to make important decisions about the shape and texture of one’s life, as well as the reasonable means to carry these decisions out. While the market in many respects can facilitate this autonomy, it can also curtail it through either leaving women little time or energy beyond market and family work, or by curtailing their imaginations from conceiving ways of life less tied to market work. Mainstream feminism should recognize that increasing women’s autonomy requires not only recognizing coercion by men or by the state, but also by the market. As Jennifer Nedelsky observes, the societal structures we inhabit can advance or inhibit autonomy (Nedelsky, 2011); the project of increasing women’s autonomy requires restructuring the institution of the market to support, rather than retard, women’s freedom.

Fourth, and finally, and again returning to the issue of the practicability of the gender parity strategy, Marxian feminists understood that a strategy of gender parity without seeking to flatten the other steep hierarchies in American society misunderstands the way that these hierarchies are perpetuated. Gender, they recognized, does not operate completely separately from other axes of power in our society. In Alison Jaggar’s words, “capitalism, male dominance, racism and imperialism are intertwined so inextricably that they are inseparable; consequently the abolition of any of these systems of domination requires the end of all of them” (Jaggar, 1983, p. 124). In recognizing the interrelated nature of these different axes of power, Marxian feminists were ahead of their time: contemporary feminist conceptualizations of the discursive nature of power demonstrate the way that these strands repeatedly weave together in cultural narratives (see, e.g., David & Enarson, 2012; Reger, 2012). Mainstream feminism too must begin to recognize that without eliminating domination along other axes, gender equality is an unattainable goal (see also Roberts, 1997, pp. 79–80).

The Problem with Treating Success among Women as a Zero-Sum Game

In setting the goal of workplace parity, early second-wave feminism treated the interests of women as a zero-sum game, pursuing the interests of middle-class women while diserving working-class women’s interests. Even feminist calls for regulating private daycare or providing public daycare
have generally been framed in terms of these daycares freeing women with children to obtain more challenging jobs rather than in terms of ensuring that women who are performing paid care work for others are treated properly and compensated fairly. As second-wave feminism progressed, the mainstream framing of this problem changed to some extent, but not in ways that incorporate the concerns of working-class women. Instead, because of pushback from middle-class stay-at-home mothers, mainstream feminism now frames the issue of paid work as one of personal choice: women should be able to stay at home if they desire, or to work outside the home if they choose; either is deemed a respectable choice for women. Of course, these options are a choice only for relatively well-to-do women, and their obtaining paid work still requires working-class women to do the care work (see Roberts, 1997). Far less attention has been paid to the obstacles impeding the flourishing of working-class and poor women, many of whom must work irregular hours, and who face issues of unemployment, under-employment, and precarious employment. Indeed, their problems often do not register as feminist problems at all, but instead as class problems that fall out of feminism’s purview. Yet, as Dorothy Roberts wisely observes, the devaluation of the care work that working-class women perform ultimately redounds to the detriment of women generally, since it depresses the value of all women’s care work (Roberts, 1997, p. 79).

Contemporary feminism could profit by recognizing that there are other, more productive ways to frame social issues than as strategic action problems among individuals. Indeed, to Marx, a key problem with market society is that citizens come to see their actions with others as a zero-sum game in which each citizen competes against others for scarce resources. The market system therefore, in Alison Jaggar’s words, “obsures the ways in which the members of a society are interdependent; it sets individuals in competition with each other so that they learn to view one another as potential enemies and are unable to perceive their mutual dependence and the interests they have in common” (Jaggar, 1983, p. 58). In such a system, while individuals may be rationally pursuing their own interests in terms of how they make choices, the results are in no one’s interests, in the sense that no one lives the kind of life they would choose if they could collectively determine a societal framework.

Analyses by Marxian feminists highlight the ways that the operations of the market, as it is currently structured, negatively affect all women, even if it does so in very different ways. They also highlight the ways that none of the options currently open to individual women in structuring their work and family lives are truly “free” or liberating. Shifting the focus in this
manner constructs the situation of these women, not as a zero-sum game, but as a shared problem that can and should be dealt with through a search for ways to live together in which paid work and care work are shared by all, and in a humane manner, and in which all citizens have at least some time for leisure and other pursuits. Doing so requires rethinking, in fundamental ways, the nature of the organization of work and family to make both more truly livable.

TOWARD MARKET-CAUTIOUS FEMINISM

What would a reconstructed feminist program that was more cognizant of the complicated relationship between markets, on the one hand, and women’s equality, autonomy, and well-being, on the other, look like? Here, I briefly sketch out principles that might guide this program, accepting a basic societal framework that includes market capitalism, but believing that this framework should be structured in ways that use the state’s democratic power to cabin the power of markets insofar as they hinder rather than promote important societal goods (see also Tronto, 2013). I call this program “market-cautious feminism,” to signal its positioning between that of feminists who seek women’s parity in the existing market system, on the one hand, and that of Marxian feminists who disavow the market system entirely, on the other.

The principles for regulating markets and reforming public policies described here are not gender specific and therefore may be taken by some not to sound in feminism. This misperception derives, at least in part, from a tendency to identify policies as feminist only insofar as they focus specifically on gender. This too narrowly frames the scope of feminism: the current operations of the market restrict the autonomy of women and forecloses many possibilities for them, as well as precludes achieving sex equality. Restructuring the market to address these issues is therefore a feminist project. As earlier Marxian feminists argued, we must “conceiv[e] of contemporary male dominance as part of the economic foundation of society, understanding ‘economic’ to include childbearing and sexual activity. On the socialist feminist view, therefore, the abolition of male dominance requires a transformation of the economic foundation of society as a whole” (Jaggar, 1983, p. 147). Or, as Joan Kelly put it, feminist politics must not only seek “to restructure personal relations as relations among peers,” it must also
“reach and transform the social organization of work, property, and power” (Kelly, 1979, p. 224).

The fact that many men, too, are benefited by such a project (it should go without saying) is an added plus that make these principles no less feminist. Once again, it is worth recalling Marx’s point that seeing the world in terms of a zero-sum game is not inevitable, but instead a world view that capitalism encourages. Feminism’s goal should be to lift women up. Public policies that do so are no less feminist because they benefit men as well. To the extent that such policies improve the lives of all, rather than just women, they should be embraced. So, on to the principles.

Supporting Better Paid Work
First, market-cautious feminism should focus not just on workplace access for women in order to ensure gender parity, but on getting workers better work, as well as giving them more control over their work situations. Feminists like Vicki Schultz may have too uncritically accepted the centrality of market work to a meaningful human life, however she was not wrong in recognizing that work can be a meaningful experience that expands human capacities; nor was she wrong in recognizing that the current state of wage work often fails to meet this goal (Schultz, 2000). Accordingly, market-cautious feminism should recognize that paid work can and often is an important part of a rich, full life, but this is far more often the case when workers are adequately paid for their work, they have significant autonomy, they like what they do, and their work helps to expand their capabilities. As such, feminists should move beyond simply calling for women’s work to be equal to men’s; we should call instead for a labor market whose terms serve not only the profit motive of capitalists but the needs, interests, and capacities of workers (see also Schultz, 2000). As a corollary, feminists should recognize that some of the necessary work that must be performed in any flourishing society, both in the paid workplace and unpaid home, will be hard and unpleasant; this work, to the extent possible, should be shared fairly among the members of a society, and should be fairly compensated (Walzer, 1984).

The most realistic means to ensure adequate terms and conditions of work in a market-oriented system is through a system of collective bargaining that gives workers significant bargaining power. Yet since the 1970s, the power and reach of unions in the United States have fallen considerably (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). This is not because workers are less interested in unions or see them as less important; in fact, significantly more nonunionized
workers today are interested in being unionized than in 1984 (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Neither is unions’ decline in the United States the inevitable product of globalization; in some Western countries, union membership has declined little or not at all (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Instead, as Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson convincingly argue, much of the decline of unions comes from employers’ efforts to stop union organizing, in combination with the failure of U.S. laws to protect collective action by employees (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). A market-cautious feminist program that seeks to improve work must therefore make support for unions and reform of labor laws a top priority.

In addition, market-cautious feminism should press for employment laws that forge a better compromise between the interests of employers and their workers. These include laws that increase workers’ job security, as well as those that provide workers with benefits and family-friendly policies (Schultz, 2000). By the same token, feminists should also push for a higher minimum wage and other measures that would decrease the vast wage inequality that currently exists in the United States (Matthews, 2012; Schultz, 2000). In contrast to existing mainstream feminism, the goal should be to alter the free-market system to better serve women’s (and others’) interests, not simply to allow women to achieve gender parity in a system that serves well the needs of a few people. This means replacing the narrow goal of labor-market parity with a broader vision of how citizens can live together better, more equally, and with human dignity. The goal should be a labor market structured in a manner that serves citizens, not a society in which citizens’ lives are focused on serving the market. In the inimitable words of Dalla Costa and James:

If women demand in workers’ assemblies that the night-shift be abolished because at night, besides sleeping, one wants to make love – and it’s not the same as making love during the day if the women work during the day – that would be advancing their own independent interests as women against the social organization of work, refusing to be unsatisfied mothers for their husbands and children. (Dalla Costa & James, 1972, p. 38)

Feminists should also support macroeconomic policies that serve the interests of workers. This means feminists should press for monetary policies that favor high employment over those that guard against the risk of inflation (Matthews, 2012). In an economy with high unemployment, workers are much less able to bargain for better wages and work conditions, and are far more likely to stay in mediocre jobs because of the fear that they will not be able to find better jobs (Bernstein & Baker, 2013; Krugman, 2013). This contributes to the situation that we have in the American
economy today, in which corporate profits have soared far above the levels experienced before the 2008 recession, but American wages have not recovered (Schwartz, 2013). Market-cautious feminism favors using macroeconomic policies to redress this situation.

Finally, market-cautious feminism would also support alternative methods of organizing work besides the traditional employer-owned model. One alternative form of organization with significant promise is the worker-owned cooperative. This form of enterprise, in contrast to the dominant model, is controlled democratically; workers actively participate in decision making, and share in the profits of the enterprise (Orsi, 2012). These enterprises not only give workers more control of their work situation, but they also offer the possibility of yielding far more economic equality than has resulted in the United States from the standard capitalist-owned model of enterprise (Alperovitz, 2005).

Supporting Less Paid Work
At the same time that they support better paid work, market-cautious feminists should also seek less work for workers (Weeks, 2011). Reducing the standard work-week of all workers to 35 hours or below will reduce the likelihood that women with caretaking responsibilities will have to pull back from complete attachment to the workforce. It will also better enable all employees, not just those with children, to get a life outside of paid and unpaid work. And it will more evenly distribute paid work among citizens than today’s considerably unequal distribution (Jacobs & Gerson, 2004). The only current limit on work hours in the United States is the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires that employees be paid overtime if they work more than 40 hours per week (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 1938). In addition to reducing this limit to 35 hours per week, market-cautious feminists should seek to strengthen this law from simply a requirement of paid overtime to an actual prohibition on requiring employees to work more hours. Strong unions would increase the political feasibility of such limits, as well as help put in place collective bargaining agreements that institute such limits privately.

Supporting the Commoning of Some Care Work
Third, market-cautious feminists should seek to foster some “commoning” of the care work and other household work that is currently performed in private families. As earlier Marxian feminists recognized, freedom – defined in Marx’s terms as the realm of life beyond the work that individuals are required to perform – is a social achievement, rather than an
individual one; it requires societal structures that support it (Jaggar, 1983). The time demands of the care work needed to raise sound children and to support sound adults, as well as the housework, cooking, and other tasks necessary to achieve ordered households in the privatized American mode of living, make it difficult for American women, and only slightly less difficult for men, to have much of a life beyond care work and paid work. These time demands have also resulted in women’s marginalization in the labor market. The fact that most Americans live in private homes means that each family devotes its own long hours to labor that could be shared rather than duplicated. This privatized lifestyle also reinforces the demand for money by curtailing families’ options for satisfying caretaking and household needs: in this setup, commoditizing the satisfaction of these needs by paying cash for a babysitter or buying prepared food becomes the path of least resistance (Himmelweit, 1995, p. 13). This makes the development of communal forms of living, or “communities of care,” important for market-cautious feminism (Federici, 2012, p. 125). As Silvia Federici states, “the reorganization of reproductive work, and therefore the reorganization of housing and public space, is not a question of identity; it is a question of labor” (Federici, 2010) (paraphrasing Hayden, 2002).22

It is difficult to imagine many Americans returning to the communes that some tried in the 1960s. Yet there are other forms of shared living that are more practicable for contemporary American life that would ease the domestic burden on citizens. These include cohousing that contains private dwelling units but also some shared space for communal care work and other household work. In fact, some of these forms are already thriving in certain places.

Charles Montgomery writes about N Street in Davis, California, which began in 1986 when a pair of neighbors pulled down their fences and agreed to share their yards (Montgomery, 2013). Over time, more community-minded people bought or rented adjoining properties, the community built a larger common house, and what became known as “N Street Cohousing” won designation as a planned development, after which it increased the housing density on its property (Montgomery, 2013). While members still own their houses and their yards, they share use of their yards and pool some care work (Montgomery, 2013). The common house, which members pay $25 a month to use, provides laundry facilities, a community room, and a dining room that can seat dozens of people (Montgomery, 2013). Members can eat communally or in their private homes according to their desires; those who want to eat together take turns preparing dinners for the group (Montgomery, 2013). As Montgomery
describes it, “It’s a uniquely market-responsive kind of sharing, which allows each person to adjust to a level of engagement or retreat that feels right at any particular moment … The model pays biophilic dividends: by sharing their block, everyone in effect enjoys a gigantic green backyard. It pays logistical dividends too: parents feel comfortable sending their kids out to play in the super-yard, knowing that dozens of eyes will be watching them from the homes that surround it” (Montgomery, 2013, p. 144).

Market-cautious feminism’s support for the commoning of care work should also lead it to favor city planning that reduces urban sprawl. As Katharine Silbaugh observes, sprawl decreases opportunities for collective responses to work-family conflicts in a number of ways (Silbaugh, 2007). It means that children are less likely to be able to walk to school by themselves, and parents are less likely to have, as well as to know, others nearby with whom they could enter into formal or informal shared childcare arrangements (Silbaugh, 2007). Sprawl also requires that younger children be picked up by a parent rather than walked home from school by older children, and means that children need parents to drive them to after-school activities, like music lessons and soccer games or to the orthodontist (Silbaugh, 2007). Finally, urban sprawl necessitates that families have at least one car, sometimes two, for adults to commute to work and to transport children to after-school activities, which increases the need for more family income and therefore puts more pressure on parents to work longer hours (Silbaugh, 2007).

In contrast to policies such as single-use residential zoning, feminists should support more compact, mixed-use residential neighborhoods. These neighborhoods decrease the amount of time that family members must spend individually shepherding children places. Further, both the density and the facilitation of social interaction that these neighborhoods foster increased opportunities for both formal and informal shared childcare arrangements. Such neighborhoods give families the choice of less privatized alternatives for sharing domestic work than do the dominant privatized home/suburban family model, in which family members must perform the work themselves. Further, they do so without sacrificing the result of flourishing citizens, families, and communities.

Fostering Economic Equality, Not Only Within Families, but Also Among Families

While mainstream feminism has ardently pursued increasing intra-family economic equality, it has been far less energetic in its pursuit of inter-family economic equality. Yet pursuit of this latter goal is important to women’s
well-being, and not simply for the obvious reason that the inequality redounds to many women’s detriment. Research repeatedly shows that disparities in wealth increase citizens’ perceptions of how much they need to earn – the “keeping up with the Jones’s” phenomenon – which, in turn, pushes them to devote more of their lives to paid work (see, e.g., Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013, pp. 9–11; see also Himmelweit, 1995, pp. 14–15). Furthermore, the low wages and underemployment associated with working-class men has required their partners to enter the workplace, and for longer hours, often in unrewarding jobs to maintain their family’s standard of living (Mishel et al., 2012). While the political will to reduce inequality is an issue, much of the broad outlines of the means to achieve this, including a more progressive system of taxation and strong unions, are clear.

Reducing Consumerism, While Fostering Spaces for Freedom

Finally, a market-cautious feminism would seek to dampen the more pernicious effects of capitalism in American’s lives. To do so, it would support measures that interrupt the constant stream of messages that a successful life requires a high salary, a job with long hours, designer clothes, and a large, tastefully decorated home on a big lot. A satisfying life, a renegotiated feminism might posit, for both women and men, comes from meaningful work, close ties with families and others, and opportunities for self-growth, relaxation, and civic involvement. Market-cautious feminism would also push back against the view that the societal ideal should be a constantly expanding economic pie and a standard of living that rises every generation. It might, as a result, support a public information campaign with the theme that “enough is enough.” An essential part of the project to ensure that nonwork and nonconsumption activities are not squeezed out and devalued by the effects of capitalism must be the reduction of income inequality among households. This inequality is a central driver of the notion that success equates with money, and that all needs can best be met by money (Himmelweit, 1995).

Market-cautious feminism would also support creation of public spaces that citizens can easily access, which are removed from the privatized home and privatized workplace, and that are not imbued with marketing messages. Some of the earlier principles laid out focus on clearing spaces for citizens to have the time to inhabit this realm should they choose to do so. But freedom, as Marx recognized, requires more than simply that the liberal state not actively interfere with the choices of individuals: it requires some democratic coordination to make sure that a range of choices are
actually available to citizens. Feminists should seek to support a range of public spaces and opportunities for citizens to engage – or not to engage – with others. These spaces might include public parks, playgrounds, and town squares where citizens can gather, and community centers where they can take classes – an alternative to the private shopping malls that have become the only gathering spots in many towns. These areas foster citizens creating the social ties that make for a strong community, as well as help counteract the tendencies in market society to see other citizens only as competitors for jobs and other scarce resources, and to see life as a quest to buy as many material possessions as possible.

CONCLUSION

What all humans need, Betty Friedan counseled more than 50 years ago, is a “sense of mission in life that makes them live in a very large human world, a frame of reference beyond privatism and preoccupation with the petty details of daily life” (Friedan, 1963/2010, p. 444). Friedan was right about this. She was wrong, however, in thinking that simply getting women jobs in the existing workplace would bring all but a few closer to this larger world. It is time for feminists to recognize that the project of workplace parity is, at best, a way-station on the road toward this larger world, and to begin to fix their gaze on reaching this more distant goal. The route to it will require abandoning the hamster wheel in favor of a more sustainable and satisfying conception of shared human life and work.

NOTES

1. Roughly 40% of African American and Japanese American women participated steadily in the workforce in the first half of the twentieth century, while women of European ancestry’s labor participation rates ranged between 16% and 28% during this period (Amott & Matthaei, 1996, appendix C). Beginning in the 1960s, however, the labor participation rates of European American women began to rise precipitously, so that by 1990 it was 56% (see also Costa, 2000, fig. 1). During this same period, the participation rates of women of non-European descent also increased (Amott & Matthaei, 1996, appendix C).

2. The boundaries between the terms “Marxist feminism” and “socialist feminism” are contested, and as a historical matter are not completely clear. Both terms refer to feminists who believe that women’s inequality is at least in part the product of the economic system of capitalism, and who seek to apply Marx and Engel’s
thought to the position of women. Marxist feminism emerged out of the New Left in the 1960s, among feminists who contended that capitalism could more or less by itself account for women’s oppression. Socialist feminism, which emerged in the 1970s, rejected that view, believing that capitalism could account for some but not all of male dominance, and that other axes of power, including patriarchy were also responsible.

I use the term “Marxian” to describe both Marxist feminists and socialist feminists because both groups have been influenced by the views of Karl Marx. The term “Marxian” was originally applied to economists who studied and applied some of Marx’s concepts without incorporating his revolutionary agenda. That label now has been broadened to scholars outside of the field of economics who incorporate some of Marx’s critique of capitalism without necessarily advocating either revolutionary socialism or foreseeing proletarian revolution.

3. Early second-wave socialist feminists debated among themselves whether the systems of power that resulted in women’s inequality should be conceived as two separate systems – patriarchy and capitalism – or a single system that, in Iris Marion Young’s words, “showed capitalism as essentially patriarchal” (Young, 1981, p. 63). As I argue, supra, with our current understanding of power as decentered and, at least in part, as discursive, this controversy loses its force.

4. As a number of commentators have pointed out, the term “free market,” is a misnomer, as markets require a considerable amount of regulation to keep them “free.” In David Harvey’s words:

The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist [...] then they must be created, by state action if necessary. (Harvey, 2005, p.2)

I use the term “free market” here as a shorthand way to refer to a market or markets that are not regulated with social welfare objectives in mind. Of course, as Daniel Rodgers observes in his excellent book, the term “market” itself is an abstraction, used increasingly in the latter part of the twentieth century to signify a system that aggregated self-generated individual actions to reach a natural and spontaneous outcome. As Ronald Reagan presented this emerging metaphor, “You know, there really is something magic about the marketplace when it’s free to operate” (Rodgers, 2011, p. 41) (quoting Ronald Reagan, 1982).

5. For related scholarship, see Tronto 2013 (arguing that care, rather than economics, should be the central concern of democratic political life), and Fraser (2009, 2013, p. 227). Nancy Fraser’s essay Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History, in particular overlaps with the subject of this article. In it, Fraser presents a partial history of the way that certain features of second-wave feminism unexpectedly served to bolster neoliberalism and to curtail feminism’s emancipatory prospects. In particular, Fraser focuses on the non-liberal wings of second-wave feminism, and shows how particular elements of their critique bolstered the view that the market should be untethered from any larger view of a just society. In contrast, this article focuses on the role of liberal feminism in the second-wave, and
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shows how its failure to contest inequality (other than sex inequality) in the labor market, as well as its failure to oppose a broad range of hierarchies associated with the market generally, converged with certain strands of neoliberalism in the United States. Despite our different approaches, we both agree, in Fraser’s words, “that feminism’s critique of the family wage … serves today to intensify capitalism’s valorization of waged labour” (Fraser, 2009, p. 111).

6. I do not, in this section, attempt even a partial cataloging of Marxian feminist work. Instead, I seek to draw selectively on this work to develop my critique of the effects of the unstructured market on the shape and texture of women’s lives.

7. Friedan’s critique of the labor market looks less surprising in light of Daniel Horowitz’s biography of Friedan (Horowitz, 1998), which revealed that Friedan had a longstanding relationship with the New Left before writing The Feminine Mystique.

8. Ninety-five percent of all child-care workers are women. Child-care worker is the 14th most common job category for women, directly behind maid and housekeeping cleaner (Boushey, 2009, p. 40). More than half (56%) of all home care workers who care for the elderly or those with chronic disabilities or illnesses are women of color (Henrici, 2013; Hess & Henrici, 2013).

9. Economist Robert Frank attributes Americans’ failure to take available vacation time to the societal emphasis on productivity over leisure which is driven by relative rather than absolute wealth. Frank describes this system as “smart for one, dumb for all” (Frank, 1999, p. 157).

10. Married mothers experienced a decline in civic activities from 4 to 1.6 hours per week, and from 27% reporting such activities to about 11%. Single mothers had approximately a half-hour decline (from 1.8 to 1.3 hours per week) in activities, and a drop from 17% to 9% in those reporting civic pursuits (Bianchi et al., 2006, p. 107).

11. In a study led by Miller McPherson, researchers found that the mean number of people with whom Americans can discuss matters important to them dropped by nearly one-third between 1985 and 2004, from 2.94 people in 1985 to 2.08 people, and that the diversity of people with whom they could discuss such matters also decreased (McPherson et al., 2006, pp. 357–358). The McPherson study has been criticized as relying on survey data that contained particular anomalies (Fischer, 2009; Fraser, 2009) and the conclusion of this debate remains unclear (see also McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2009). Other studies have found that the average size and diversity of core discussion networks have declined, albeit not as steeply as the McPherson (2006) study suggested. (See Hampton, Sessions Goulet, Her, & Rainie, 2009).

12. As Fraser convincingly argues, promoting women’s role as breadwinners, and touting the importance of women achieving economic power – both laudable goals – unintentionally offered support to an emerging pro-market, anti-government ideology that began to take root in the 1970s and strengthened in the following decades. In this ideology, women’s new goal of economic independence was taken to mean that the government no longer needed to protect them and their families; instead, the expectation of economic independence was properly applied to all adults. Meanwhile, the goal of women achieving economic parity with men became folded into an ideology that viewed market mechanisms, rather than government, as the proper means to further social goods (Fraser, 2013).
13. Although some traditional Marxists read Marx as positing that the social world, “or superstructure,” is completely determined by the “economic base” of society, as Alison Jaggar observes, Marx may not have intended his work to posit such a strong causal relationship between base and superstructure. Instead, he may have meant only to posit that the base sets some limits on the superstructure, and that each affects the other dialectically (Jaggar, 1983, pp. 141–142).


15. This measure of parent–child interaction put the United States behind Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2007). Only Finland and New Zealand had lower rankings (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2007).

16. In the weeks after the Wall Street Journal published an excerpt under the headline “Why Chinese Mothers Are Superior,” the excerpt reportedly generated more than 5,700 comments on the newspaper’s Web site (a record), and more than 100,000 responses on Facebook, as well as countless blog entries (Chua, 2011a; Our Readers Roar, 2011).

17. Marx saw the human essence as connected to work: “The labour-process … is human action with a view to the production of use-values, appropriation of natural substances to human requirements” (Marx, 1867/1906, p. 204).

18. As noted supra note 14, men’s median earnings have fallen by 19% since 1970; the earnings of men with just a high-school degree have fallen by 41%. Further, since about 1980 the percentage of men in middle-skill jobs has declined. Roughly half that decline comes from the increase in low-skill jobs (Coontz, 2014).

19. Selma James similarly observed: “There has been enough confusion generated when sex, race and class have confronted each other as separate and even conflicting entities. That they are separate entities is self-evident. That they have proven themselves to be not separate, [but] inseparable, is harder to discern” (James, 2012, p. 92; accord hooks, 1984).

20. As Peter Singer pointed out, what Marx recognized is that within capitalism, although people are free in the sense used by liberals, in the sense of formal non-interference by others, they are not free in the sense of having real control over the shape and operation of their lives:

Economic relations between human beings determine not only our wages and our prospects of finding work, but also our politics, our religion, and our ideas... These conditions nullify technical advances in the use of our resources. Rationally organized, industrialization should enable us to enjoy an abundance of material goods with a minimum of effort; under capitalism, however, these advances simply reduce the value of the commodity produced, which means that the worker must work just as long for the same wage ... Economic relations appear to us blind natural forces. We do not see them as restricting our freedom – and indeed on the liberal conception of freedom they do not restrict our freedom, since they are not the result of deliberate human interference. (Singer, 2000, pp. 91–92)

22. Katharine Silbaugh more recently made a similar point:

Over the past generation, we have formally disavowed the idea that a woman’s place is in the home. But we remain attached to a vision of domestic living that depends on female labor to create a sphere of comfort protected from public life. The stability of that vision is embodied in the persistence of housing design that was fueled by the post-WWII reinvigoration of the home as a woman’s work sphere. The single-family home absorbs a tremendous amount of labor. That is not just an unfortunate side effect of an optimal living arrangement: the promotion of the single-family home was based on the encouragement given to women to embrace household labor in the post-war era after leaving factory work (Silbaugh, 2007, p. 1830).

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